Recently, a universally composable framework for RFID authentication protocols providing availability, anonymity, and authenticity was proposed. In this paper we extend that framework to address forward-security issues in the presence of key compromise.
INTRODUCTION
While admittedly a new technology, radio-frequency identification devices (RFID)s have great potential for business automation applications and as smart, mass-market, embedded devices. However, several security and privacy concerns have been identified in connection with the use of RFIDs. In this paper, we concentrate on the use of RFIDs as authentication devices. We start by elaborating on the significant characteristics that distinguish RFID authentication models from general-purpose authentication.
• Lightweight. RFID authentication protocols must be lightweight. Many RFID platforms can only implement highly optimized symmetric-key cryptographic techniques.
• Anonymity. General-purpose authentication protocols may or may not have support for anonymity. On the other hand, many proposed RFID applications typically require anonymity fundamentally, for instance for devices embedded in human bodies or their clothes, documents, etc. So anonymity should be considered a core requirement of RFID authentication protocols.
• Availability. RFID authentication protocols are not only vulnerable to classical attacks on authenticationimpersonation, man-in-the-middle, etc-but also to attacks that force the RFID device to assume a state from which it can no longer successfully authenticate itself. Such vulnerabilities are often exacerbated by the portable nature of RFID devices, allowing them to be manipulated at a distance by covert readers.
• Forward-security. RFID devices may be discarded, are easily captured, and may be highly vulnerable to sidechannel attacks on the stored keys. Forward-security is important to guarantee the privacy of past transactions if the long-term key or current session key are compromised.
• Concurrent Security. Current RFID devices support only sequential execution. However, overall security system using RFIDs are nearly always highly concurrent. 1 Therefore, it is important to address security of the overall protocol (involving the RFIDs and other system entities) in concurrent environments, where it is assumed that adversary can adaptively modify communications.
Our goals are to design authentication protocols that will be used as sub-protocols in ubiquitous applications, or as standalone applications in combination with other applications. As such, we seek to develop protocols that can be analyzed only once and then applied universally. In order to achieve this, we adopt a specific approach to the formalization of protocol security know as the Universal Composability (UC) framework. Protocols shown to be UC-secure remain secure under concurrent and modular composition, and therefore are easily plugged into more complex protocols without requiring security reassessment with each new use.
Universally Composable Security
UC security is based on notions of interactive indistinguishability of real from ideal protocol executions. This approach requires the following components:
1. A mathematical model of real protocol executions. In this model, honest parties are represented by probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines (PPT) that correctly execute the protocol as specified, and adversarial parties that can deviate from the protocol in an arbitrary fashion. The adversarial parties are controlled by a single PPT adversary that (1) has full knowledge of the state of adversarial parties, (2) can arbitrarily schedule the communication channels and activation periods of all parties, both honest and adversarial, and (3) interacts with the environment in arbitrary ways, in particular can eavesdrop on all communications.
2. An idealized model of protocol executions, where the security properties do not depend on the correct use of cryptography, but instead on the behavior of an ideal functionality, a trusted party that all parties may invoke to guarantee correct execution of particular protocol steps. The ideal-world adversary is controlled by the ideal functionality, to reproduce as faithfully as possible the behavior of the real adversary.
3. A proof that no environment can distinguish (with better than negligible accuracy) real-from ideal-world protocol runs by observing the system behavior, including exchanged messages and outputs computed by the parties (honest and adversarial). The proof works by translating real-world protocol runs into the ideal world.
An important separation between theory and practice is efficiency. We design our protocols to minimize security overhead when the system is not under attack (optimistic behavior). Achieving this goal together with availability and forward-security in a lightweight manner suitable for RFIDs is a nontrivial task, as witnessed in the literature. (A review of prior work is provided in Section 2.)
Our contributions.
• A new UC authentication framework, that extends the model introduced in [9] to include anonymity and forward-security, in Section 4.
• New protocols that provide for optimistic, forwardanonymous authentication and that guarantee availability and minimize security overhead in the honest case, in Section 4.
• Lightweight implementation of the protocols in a widevariety of RFID architectures by using only PRGs, in Section 6.
• Featherweight PRG-based protocols that achieve identical security guarantees with a simpler architecture under the assumption that the adversary has only timelimited opportunities to interact with tags ("fly-by" attacks), in Section 7.
• Security proofs for the protocol families, in Sections 5, 6, and 7.
PREVIOUS WORK
The need for lightweight security mechanisms in RFID applications does not imply that one can afford to provide security under limited attack models, since attackers may have additional resources. For instance, Bono et al. [8] have shown how realistic, simple attacks can compromise tags that use encryption with small keys-even though only brief interactions between attackers and the target tag ever take place-we shall call such limited-interaction attacks fly-by attacks. Proposed protocols, some very ingenious [26] , which enjoy strong security properties under limited attack models [28] have been shown to be vulnerable to simple man-inthe-middle-attacks [19] that could be implemented as fly-by attacks. Other interesting protocols, such as YA-TRAP [37] , use timestamps. While effective in reducing complexity, the use of timestamps leaves the tags vulnerable to denial-ofservice attacks that can permanently invalidate the tags, as pointed out by G. Tsudik in [37] .
The research literature in RFID security, including anonymous authentication protocols, is already quite extensive and growing-for reference, a fairly comprehensive repository is available online at [2] . Here, we shall refrain from a comprehensive review and focus consideration on those works most directly related to our construction. Ohkubo et al. [33] proposed a hash-based authentication protocol that bears close resemblance to our protocols. However, the scheme in [33] is vulnerable to certain re-play attacks. The proposed modifications in [3] address the replay-attack problem but does not consider the issue of availability, and their scheme is vulnerable to attacks where the attacker forces an honest tag to fall out of synchronization with the server so that it can no longer authenticate itself successfully. Dimitriou [18] also proposes an anonymous RFID protocol vulnerable to desynchronization attacks against availability.
Another hash-based authentication protocol is introduced by Henrici et al. [23] . Their solution does not provide full privacy guarantees, in particular, the tag is vulnerable to tracing when the attacker interrupts the authentication protocol mid-way. Molnar et al. [31] propose a hash-tree based authentication scheme for RFIDs. However, the amount of computation required per tag is not constant, but logarithmic with the number of tags in the hash-tree. Also, if a tag is lost, anonymity for the rest of the hash-tree group may be compromised. Finally, the scheme does not provide for forward-anonymity. A scheme by Juels [25] only provides security against "fly-by" attacks where the attacker is allowed to interact with the tag for a fixed time budget but does not provide protection in the case of tag capture. 
Figure 1: Ideal anonymous authentication
There is comparatively little work on RFID protocols where security is provided in a unified model (for examples, see [1, 9] ). In this paper we articulate security models for anonymous RFID authentication and key exchange protocols. These models extend the framework introduced in [9] in several ways. In particular, we support session-key compromise and replacement, extending the model in that paper to keyexchange protocols ( [9] considers only authentication). Note that Juels and Weiss [27] propose an alternative anonymity definition following a traditional adversary-game approach (i.e., without consideration for concurrent composability issues).
The proposed model defines security in terms of indistinguishability between real and ideal protocol simulations, an approach first outlined by Beaver [7, 6, 5] , and extended by Canetti as the universal composability framework [10, 11, 12] . A similar approach has also been pursued by Pfitzmann and Waidner [35, 36] , under the name reactive systems. Several protocols have been proposed under the UC framework, including authentication and key-exchange [15, 24, 14] , zero-knowledge proofs [13, 16] , and other cryptographic primitives [29] , and some privacy-enhanced RFID protocol [1] .
UC FORMALIZATION
As noted in Section 1.1, the UC model requires both a model of real protocol executions (familiar from traditional Byzantine security models) as well as a model of ideal protocol executions. The real-world model of protocol executions simply has the honest parties execute the protocol, while adversarial parties are centrally controlled by an adversary. As in other Byzantine settings, all real-world parties, including the adversary A, are probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines (PPTs). The real-world adversary can eavesdrop into and schedule all communication channels. It can moreover schedule the activation order of parties.
In both the real and ideal world simulations, the adversary interacts with a PPT, 2 the environment Z. In the UC framework, the context of a protocol execution is captured by a session identifier sid. The sid is generated by the environment Z, and represents the link between a protocol session and its execution environment. All parties involved in a protocol execution instance share the same sid, and all protocol inputs and outputs are annotated with this sid. In particular, the security proof cannot make any assumptions about extraneous knowledge that may or not be available to Z through interactions with other entities (including other instances of the protocol). The environment Z is the first party to become active in any simulation, and it activates the adversary next. If the adversary (and all other parties) become inactive, control passes to the environment. The adversary and Z may interact in arbitrary ways, and the real-world simulation halts when the environment halts.
The ideal world, however, departs considerably from the real world, in that honest parties are controlled by an ideal functionality. We now describe the ideal functionalities corresponding to forward-secure anonymous authentication and forward-secure anonymous key exchange, respectively. We also describe an extra functionality, that we call anonymous wireless communication. This last functionality captures an (implicit) assumption in all protocols for anonymous RFID authentication, namely that the RFID communication layers provide for anonymous communication channels. In the following, each of these functionalities is described in detail.
To honest protocol parties, the ideal functionality represents the guarantees that any protocol securely implementing this ideal functionality will provide. To the adversarial parties, the ideal functionality represents the adversarial effects they can cause on honest parties running the protocol. In other words, the ideal functionality represents the observable effects of a secure protocol on each parties.
Observe that the ideal functionality guarantees security unconditionally, and thus does not rely on any cryptographic primitives that are computationally secure. This is because, in the UC framework, unconditionally secure ideal functionality is required for concurrent executions.
Functionality F aake F aake has session identifier sid and only admits messages with the same sid.
Upon receiving input Initiate from protocol party p : if party p is corrupted then ignore this message. Else generate a unique subsession identification s, record init(s, p) and send init(s, type(p), active(p)) to the adversary.
Upon receiving message Accept(s, s ) from the adversary: if there are two records init(s, p) and init(s , p ) such that parties p and p are feasible partners, then remove these records, generate a random key k, record partner(s , p , s, p, k) and write output ACCEPT(p , k) to party p. Else if there is a record partner(s, p, s , p , k) then remove this record and write output ACCEPT(p , k) to party p.
Upon receiving message Impersonate(s, p , k ) from the adversary: if there is a record init(s, p) and party p is corrupted then remove this record, and write output ACCEPT(p , k ) to p.
Upon receiving message Corrupt(s) from the adversary: if there is a record init(s, p) or partner(s, p, s , p , k) such that p is corruptible then mark p as corrupted and remove state(p).
Figure 2: Ideal anonymous authenticated key exchange
the two parties having secure access to an anonymous entity authentication functionality, which we denote by F aauth . This functionality is presented in Figure 1 .
Parties. There are two types of protocol parties, server and tag. In each session, there is a single instance of a party of type server and arbitrarily many instances of type tag. The function type(p) returns the type of party p in the current session. The UC entities, such as adversary A and the environment Z, are not protocol parties per se, though A may control several protocol parties.
Sessions. A single session spans the complete life-time (simulation instance) of our authentication scheme. It consists of many concurrent subsessions, which are initiated by protocol parties upon receiving input Initiate from the environment Z. While the server and tags initiate subsessions, the adversary controls the concurrency and interaction between these subsessions. Two protocol parties are feasible partners in authentication if they are, respectively, a server and a tag. Upon successful completion of a subsession, each party accepts its corresponding partner as authenticated. The environment Z may read the output tapes of the tags and server at any moment during the session, which terminates when the environment Z stops. The environment Z may contain many other sessions of arbitrary protocols, thus allowing our protocol to start and run concurrently with arbitrary others. All parties involved in a subsession of the authentication scheme are given a unique session identifier sid by the environment Z.
Authenticity. Successful authentication in the real world is a result of sharing common secrets-one party can corroborate the values produced by another as functions of the shared secrets. The choice of authentication partners is decided by the real adversary, who has full control of the network. In the ideal world, this is emulated by the ideal adversary via invocations of the command Accept, one for each ideal partner. The true identity of the partner is solely given to the verifying parties, regardless of the action of the adversary. This limits the adversary to invocation of the protocols and scheduling of the output of each party only.
Anonymity. The only information revealed to the adversary by the functionality is the type of the party, whether it is a tag or server. The difference between tag and server is observable since the real server always starts the protocol.
Forward-security. The real adversary may corrupt activated tags-the server is considered incorruptible-obtaining keys and any persistent memory values. These may compromise the anonymity of the current subsession and earlier incomplete ones by the same corrupted party. In order to corrupt a tag not actively running, the environment Z may request the tag to start a new subsession and then inform the adversary to corrupt it. In general, security is only guaranteed for subsessions of an uncorrupted honest tag. The effect of corruption in the ideal world, via command Corrupt, is that the adversary can impersonate corrupted tags, via Impersonate command. Upon corruption, the adversary may also link all incomplete subsessions of the same party, up to the last successfully completed, through acquiring knowledge of active(p)-the list of identifications of all preceding incomplete subsession, returned from the functionality after a Initiate command. Once a subsession is successfully completed in the ideal world, this subsession and all earlier subsessions of the same party are protected against all future corruptions of any party. Therefore, the ideal world provides forward-security only for completed subsessions of honest tags.
In the functionality, state(p) is the list of all subsession records maintained by the functionality concerning party p in the current session. This list is removed from the memory of ideal functionality up on corruption of the tag p, and effectively leaves control of the corrupted tag to the adversary. The only information retained is the fact that p is corrupted.
Activation sequence. In our protocols and functionalities, the receiving party of any message or subroutine output is activated next. If no outgoing message or subroutine output is produced in the processing of an incoming message, then by convention the environment Z is activated next.
Anonymous authenticated key-exchange
Key exchange protocols are required for RFIDs that communicate with multiple servers, including bogus ones, to collect and share information with the servers. For example, a tag may stores sale-related information to support after-sale applications of a retailer.
Functionality Fcom Fcom has session identifier sid. It only admits messages with the same sid.
Upon receiving input Channel from party p: generate a unique channel identification c, a record channel(c, p) and write output c to and reactivate party p.
Upon receiving input Listen(c) from party p: if there is a record channel(c, p) then record listen(c, p) and send message listen(c) to the adversary.
Upon receiving input Broadcast(c, m) from party p: send message broadcast(c, m) to the adversary.
Upon receiving message Deliver(c, m) from the adversary: if there is a record listen(c, p) then remove this record and write output m to and reactivate party p.
Figure 3: Ideal anonymous communication
The functionality for anonymous key-exchange F aake is presented in Figure 2 . This functionality is a fairly straightforward extension of F aauth . Authentic keys are computed as an additional, private output at the result of a successful subsession.
F aake is activated by an Initiate input from a party belonging to the session. The list of existing subsessions since its last successfully completed subsession are released to the adversary via message init(s, type(p), active(p)), where s is a newly created subsession identification. F aake also stores locally the record init(s, p).
Corruption is as in the entity authentication functionality. It is achieved by the adversary invoking the command Corrupt. Again, successful authenticated key exchange in the real world is a result of sharing secrets. This is achieved in the ideal world by invocations of the command Accept by the ideal adversary, one for each partner in the pair. This only succeeds if the two parties are both requesting authentication. Successful subsessions result in each party accepting the partner's true identity and generating a shared subsession key.
As before, the adversary can impersonate parties in the ideal world by invoking the command Impersonate, which only succeeds if the impersonated party is corrupted.
Session-key indistinguishability. The anonymous authenticated key-exchange functionality F aake provides for sessionkey indistinguishability, in addition to all the security properties provided by F aauth . More specifically, if the adversary were to be given either (i) a random value, or (ii) a recently exchanged session key corresponding to a fresh authentication key, it could not distinguish the two cases. This is so because F aake generates session keys at random when the authentication key is fresh-i.e., being used for the first time since the last successful authentication session completed.
Wireless Communication
RFIDs are transponders that communicate in a wireless medium. In such a medium, communication has the potential of being anonymous, as location, network topology, and routing strategies do not disclose the identity of the communicating parties. Accordingly, our protocols require that only the type of a communicating party-server or transponder (tag)-is revealed through the use of communication.
Any RFID security protocol that provides anonymity must assume the existence of anonymous channels. To model this requirement in the UC framework, we introduce the ideal anonymous communication functionality Fcom (Figure 3) . As the communication anonymity requirement applies to both the real and idealized protocols, our description of the real protocol in Section 4 also makes use of Fcom.
PROTOCOLS
In this section we define two novel optimistic RFID authentication protocols: O-FRAP and O-FRAKE. Both protocols offer forward-anonymity, while requiring only minimal overhead when the system is not under attack (optimistic). Our protocols rely on a trusted setup and on the wireless communication functionality described earlier.
These protocols are lightweight enough for RFID deployments, yet provide strong UC security and therefore are suitable in other ubiquitous application contexts, such as sensor networks. The only restriction is that the each component playing the role of a single tag must use separate keys when performing parallel authentications/key-exchanges.
Trusted Setup and the Server Database
Trusted Setup.
The following trusted setup is done once in a physically secure environment at the beginning of the session. For each tag, a fresh, unique key triple (r, k a , k b ) is randomly generated and stored both at the tag and the server. The value r is a one-time-use pseudonym for the tag that is used for optimistic key-retrieval. Value k a is the tag's authentication key (updated after each successful authentication), and k b is a secondary, communication channel protection key that is re-computed after each successful authentication in the key-exchange variant of the protocol.
Server Database.
The tag stores the key triple in its non-volatile (re-writable) memory, while the server initializes a database D whose entries are of the form i, previous i , currenti where i is the identity of a tag, previous i and currenti are the previous and current value of tag key. At setup, previousi = (⊥, ⊥, ⊥),
The server must maintains a pair of key triples for each tag to preserve consistency though key updates in the presence of active adversaries: Since the server computes the updated triple before the tag, an adversary could tamper with the communication channel and prevent the tag from computing the updated key.
During an authentication attempt by the tag i, the server detects which key the tag is using, previousi or currenti, by looking up a given value ri. If a matching key is found, it is returned to the server via D.Retrieve(ri). If no key with matching ri is found, the complete database is returned. After successful authentication of tag i using key ctag i , the server updates previous i with ctag i , and updates currenti with a newly computed key ntag i . This operation is denoted by D.Update(i, ctag i , ntag i ).
RFID entity authentication
Our first protocol, O-FRAP, is an Optimistic Forwardsecure RFID Authentication Protocol. In this protocol, rsys and rtag are values generated pseudo-randomly by the server and the tag, respectively, so as to anonymize the session and to prevent replays. The value rtag is generated pseudorandomly for optimistic identification of the tag. Value k a tag is the tag's current key and is updated by the server after the tag is authenticated, and by the tag after the server is authenticated. 
On activation by the server, the tag computes four values ν1, ν2, ν3, ν4 by applying the pseudo-random function F to (k a tag , rtag ||r sys ). We use the following convention: If the sender writes the value x to a channel, it is observed as x by the receiver. The value x may differ from x if corrupted by the adversary while in transit.
In O-FRAP, ν1 is used to update the pseudo-random value rtag ; ν2 is used for authentication of the tag; ν3 is used to authenticate the server; ν4 is used to update k a tag . In our protocols we use the following convention: the four values computed by the server by applying the pseudo-random function F to (k a j , r tag rsys ) are denoted by ν * 1 , ν * 2 , ν * 3 , ν * 4 . When the adversary is passive, these values correspond to the non-starred values. In particular ν * 2 = ν 2 and ν * 3 = ν3, and the server and tag output ACCEPT.
Observe that the tag key k a tag is updated after each server authentication, giving strong separation properties between sessions. In particular, if a tag is compromised, it cannot be linked to transcripts of earlier sessions. This guarantees forward-anonymity.
RFID authenticated key exchange
We next describe O-FRAKE, an Optimistic Forward-secure RFID Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocol-see Figure 4 . The protocol is essentially the same as O-FRAP except that five random values ν1, ν2, ν3, ν4, ν5 are generated by the pseudo-random function F . The output value k b tag is an agreed subsession key for securing the communication channel between the server and the tag, for example to protect transmission of private information collected by the tag. Corruption or replacement of k b tag (either during the authentication protocol or during later use) is an attack on the exchanged key and has no effect on the authentication key k a tag . Furthermore, even if the adversary corrupts the tag, prior session keys are protected and prior session transcripts are unlinkable. This enforces separation of sessions and provides forward-anonymity, authenticity and secrecy.
PROOF OF SECURITY
Theorem 1. O-FRAP and O-FRAKE UC-securely implements the anonymous RFID authentication and anonymous RFID authenticated key exchange ideal functionalities, respectively.
Proof. We shall prove the theorem for O-FRAKE. O-FRAP then follows similarly. Observe that if F in the protocol is a true random function then the keys used in all fully completed tag subsessions are uniformly random and mutually independent. This means that conversations in fully completed tag subsessions are independently and identically distributed. The independence also holds for all subsessions separated by at least a fully completed subsession, where the key is refreshed. Our simulation is as follows:
• Simulate a copy b A of the real adversary A, a copy servers of the real server, a copy c tag s of a real tag for each tag subsession s and a copy b
Fcom of ideal functionality Fcom (Figure 3 ). Forward messages among simulated parties { server, c tag s , b A, b Fcom} and also between b
A and Z faithfully (Figure 4 ).
• The database b D of server contains persistent keys of corrupted tags and transient keys of active tags. Keys are added to and removed from b D on demand.
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Ideal adversary S S simulates interactions among { b A, server, c tag s , b Fcom} as described in Figures 3 and 4 . S delivers the communications between b
A and Z faithfully and emulates interactions between { server, c tag s , b Fcom} and Z as follows:
Upon receiving init(s, server, list) from F aake : Create a new subsession s for server and send init(s, server, list) to b A.
Upon receiving init(s, tag, list) from F aake : Create a new tag subsession s for a new tag named c tag s . If list is empty then generate a random key (rs, k a s , k b s ), else copy the key from a subsession identified in list. Add the specified key (rs,
In particular, instead of being regenerated, the key is updated in future executions as normally specified by the protocol. Send message Corrupt(s ) to ideal functionality F aake . • The secret key of c tag s is copied from the immediately preceding incomplete subsession, if there is one, or is randomly generated, if the immediately preceding incomplete subsession of the tag is fully completed. This key is temporarily added to b D during simulation of the subsession s, and is removed from b D after successful completion of the subsession s.
• If c tag s is corrupted during the execution of subsession s then its key will be marked as corrupted and will never be removed from b D. This allows corrupted tags to be impersonated by the adversary b A. In this case, the corrupted key is updated accordingly to the protocol after each successful impersonation of c tag s by b A.
• Emulate the externally visible part of the protocol, i.e., its interactions with Z. More specifically, invoke F aake with messages Corrupt(s), Accept(s, s ) and Impersonate(s, p ), when the real-world adversary corrupts a tag, forwards unmodified inputs between simulated tags and server, or impersonates simulated tags, respectively.
Note that although the ideal adversary S does not know the true identity of each tag, the subsession identifier and the corruption state information is enough for it to emulate correctly the interactions with Z. We describe the simulations in Figure 5 . It is straightforward to verify that if the following two conditions hold then keys used in real executions and ideal simulations are statistically identical:
1. F is a truly random function.
2. Each verification done by the server succeeds with at most one key in the database.
Consequently, the real messages and the simulated messages are also statistically identical, i.e., the real and ideal world simulations are identical. The first condition fails if F is distinguishable from true random function. The second condition fails while the first holds if there are two keys that verify the random challenge rsys and reply (rtag , ν2). For each given tag subsession, this happens with probability at most n2 1−κ , where κ is the security parameter, i.e. the minimum bit length of rsys , rtag and ν2, and n is total number of tags managed by this server. Therefore the probability that the second fails while the first holds is at most nN 2 1−κ , where N is the total number of tag subsessions. Since both conditions fail with negligible probabilities (as functions of the security parameter κ), the real and ideal worlds are computationally indistinguishable by the environment Z.
The server and tags in our protocols are kept key-synchronized as follows. First, as the initiator of the protocol, the server is always at most one step ahead of the tag in updating the key. Therefore, if the server stores the previous value of the key until the new key value is observed in use by the corresponding tag, the protocol will accommodate tags that fail to update their keys due to interference by the adversary.
Session identifiers. In our proof, we do not explicitly state the nature of the session identifier sid. The sid is used by the trusted setup to guarantee that the server and the tag in the same session share the same secret key. Without this trusted setup assumption, neither the the security nor the functionality of our protocols is guaranteed.
Security reduction. We relate distinguishing real-vs-ideal worlds to distinguishing pseudo-vs-true randomness of a function family.
Corollary 1. The advantage of distinguishing real execution from ideal simulation is at most:
where AdvF (nN, T + nN ) is the advantage of distinguishing F from a true random function by making at most nN queries to F and using at most T + nN computational steps (execution time); N is the number of tag subsessions; n is the number of tags; and T is the combined time complexity of the environment Z and the adversary A.
Proof. To prove this, faithfully simulate the real world and use Z as the distinguisher. When a truly random function F is used in the real simulation, we obtain exactly the ideal simulation, modulo a negligible probability event, namely that the second condition in the proof of Theorem 1 fails when F is truly random. Therefore, we obtain the following corollary.
LIGHTWEIGHT CONSTRUCTIONS
In this section we show how to achieve a very efficient, practical construction of O-FRAP and O-FRAKE by using only a pseudo-random generator (PRG). Estimation of the hardware requirements of a prototypical specification are of the order of 2000 gates.
Lite pseudo-random function families
We describe how to achieve a very efficient, practical construction of large-length output pseudo-random function families. First, we design a large-length output pseudo-random function (PRF) from a fixed-length output PRF and a PRG. Using ideas from [21] one can then implement the protocols by using a PRG only. For the sake of completeness we include a proof of security of the lemma below. Lemma 1. If PRG is a pseudo-random generator and PRF is a pseudo-random function then F = P RG • P RF is a pseudo-random function.
Proof. Let X, Y , W , and Z be efficiently sampleable domains and let P RF : X × Y → W be a pseudo-random function and P RG : W → Z be a pseudo-random generator. We show that F = P RG • P RF : X × Y → Z is a pseudo-random function. Indeed, let y1, y2, . . . , yn ∈ Y be distinct values and let x ∈R X. We show that z = (F (x, y1) , . . . , F (x, yn)) is indistinguishable from a random vector in Z n . Notice that F (x, yi) = P RG(wi) where wi = P RF (x, yi). Since P RF is a pseudo-random function, the vector w = (w1, . . . , wn) is pseudo-random in W n . This implies that z = (P RG(w1), . . . , P RG(wn)) is indistinguishable from z * = (P RG(w * 1 ), . . . , P RG(w * n )), where w * 1 , . . . , w * n are randomly and independently selected from W . By pseudorandomness of the distribution of P RG(w * i ) and the multisample indistinguishability theorem of Goldreich [20] and Yao [38] , z * is indistinguishable from a random vector in Z n .
Practical Implementation
For practical RFID implementations a very efficient hardware implementation of a P RG should be used. In general a P RG can be implemented much more efficiently than a standard cryptographic pseudo-random function. For instance, the shrinking generator 4 of Coppersmith, Krawczyk, and Mansour [17] can be implemented with fewer than 2000 gates with approximately 80-bit security [4], which is feasible for a wide range of RFID architectures. The best known attacks on the shrinking generator are not practical in this range of the security parameter [4] . Alternatively, other secure stream ciphers suitable for constrained hardware architectures could be used-some candidates have been submitted to the European eStream project [32] . However, designing such highly efficient stream ciphers remains challenging. For example, the proposed Grain [22] family of stream ciphers has recently been shown not to achieve full security [30] .
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Standard cryptographic constructions, such as those based on HMAC (with the extra property that the cryptographic hash function in the construction should pseudo-random), or CBC-MAC with a block cipher (for instance, AES) would require around 10-15K gates. These constructions are suitable only for a narrow range of higher cost RFID tags. However, using our constructions, one obtains a full-fledged implementation of the O-FRAP and O-FRAKE protocols using approximately 2000-3000 gates, which covers a much wider range of RFID architectures.
FEATHERWEIGHT AUTHENTICATION
In this section we consider a family of RFID authentication and key exchange protocols secure against fly-by attacks, named A-TRAP after Optimistic "Absolutely" Trivial RFID Authentication Protocols, to emphasize their minimalist structure and overhead. These protocols only require a PRG and a Time-Delay Scheduler (TDS).
The TDS is a very simple hardware device that controls the time-delay between authentication sessions. The timedelay is minimal, say t0, between complete authentication sessions-i.e., sessions that terminate with the tag's key update. After each incomplete session, the time delay is doubled. So, after m successive incomplete sessions there will be a time-delay of 2 m t0. The TDS is used to thwart attacks in which the adversary triggers incomplete sessions to desynchronize the key updates of the tag and the server. A limited number of time-delay doublings can be easily achieved using capacitors, acquiring enough energy before running the protocol, and/or counters. During this delay, the whole tag is powered down except for a counter and the clock rate is reduced to minimal, only enough to run the counter. These have the potentials to extend the delay by few orders of magnitude.
A-TRAP
A-TRAP is a mutual RFID authentication protocol in which, the tag and the server exchange values ν1, ν2, ν3, respectively, generated by the pseudo-random generator gtagsee Figure 6 . The server checks that the received value g tag is in its database D = {di,j}: if di,j = gtag then it accepts the tag as authentic. In this case it updates the i-th row of it directory D by: (a) discarding its first j entries, (b) shifting the remaining entries to the front, and finally (c), filling the empty cells with the next j values g (1) i , . . . , g from the pseudo-random generator gi (see Figure 7) . If the value g tag is not in D then the tag is rejected. A variant of A-TRAP achieves authenticated key exchange by generating a fourth value ν4 using the pseudo-random generator gtag . The security of the A-TRAP protocol is discussed next.
Security considerations
A-TRAP protocols offer limited protection against desynchronization attacks: a tag that is "interrogated" more than an upper bound of m successive times will become permanently invalidated. However, for attacks that interact with a tag for a time period shorter than 2 m t0 time units (a fly-by attack), these protocols offer provably secure authentication, forward-anonymity, availability, and forward-keyindistinguishability. The A-TRAP protocols are therefore secure against attacks in which the adversary surreptitiously desynchronizes the tag with a limited time budget for the attack.
FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS
In this paper we have not addressed attacks that exploit side-channel vulnerabilities of the tags. These attacks are likely avenues for corruption-e.g., extremely powerful poweranalysis attacks that result in full key-recovery have been implemented against current RFID architectures [34] . Ultimately, the effectiveness of such attacks demonstrate that secure RFID applications will require advances beyond protocol design. It will be necessary to modify the physical characteristics of these devices to make them more shielded against side-channel cryptanalysis, e.g. by shielding the RFID circuit from RF interferences with a Faraday cage, and/or employing independent capacitors to isolate the power source of RFID communication from that of RFID computation. Nevertheless, by introducing protocols that achieve forwardsecurity, we mitigate the consequences of corruption and key extraction: Our protocols guarantee that past, successful sessions remain anonymous and private after key compromise.
Our introduction of the ideal wireless functionality is a first step into capturing assumptions about lower network layers into the security analysis of RFID protocols. A natural extension of our work would be to relax the anonymity guarantees provided by Fcom to model information leaks by lower communication layers-including the physical layer where side-channel attacks operate. An interesting issue in this direction would be to determine the maximum sidechannel leakage bandwidth that would still permit the design of anonymous authentication protocols with strong (and composable) security properties.
Conclusion
We present highly practical RFID authentication and authenticated key-exchange protocols that are provably secure in the Universal Composability framework, and that provide for forward-anonymity, authenticity, availability, and session-key indistinguishability.
Additionally, we describe how to implement our protocols using only pseudo-random generators. Therefore, the proposed implementations are feasible for a wide range of RFID architectures.
